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1. Introduction 
Public procurement is estimated to constitute more than 16% of GDP in the EU, see e.g. 
Ramsey (2006). This is one of the reasons why a lot of interest has been attached to this topic. 
Most of the papers in this field have been of a theoretical nature but during the last ten years 
also a few empirical studies have become available, see e.g. Marion, J. (2007) and Bajari et al 
(2008). At the EU level liberalizations have been going on since the late 80’ies (see e.g. the 
EU commission (1985). Here certain regulations imply that public projects of a certain size 
need to be subject to a public tender. Again according to Ramsey (2006) around 16% of all 
public procurement in the EU is subject to these rules and regulations and information on the 
contracts corresponding to these 16% can be found in Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) 
database. In general, the hypothesis is that public procurement will increase competition and 
ultimately lead to cheaper contracts for the authorities, see e.g. Cecchini (1988) for the 
economic arguments. But in practice: do the rules and regulations ensure more competition? 
Do they lead to more internationalization in the sense that more foreign firms become contract 
winners? Do the government and municipalities in the EU countries actually gain 
economically from the procurement? Does the choice of type of procedure matter? A lot of 
interesting questions immediately pops up and some of them – but only some of them - may 
be analyzed based on the content of this data base. Still, due to the large coverage and the 
international nature of the data base we believe that a thoroughly study of the possibilities of 
TED is of major interest and the present study is just a first step in this direction. One of the 
students who extracted the TED data has also used them for analysis in his master thesis, see 
Bundsgaard (2010). He has, however, limited his interest to analyze the choice of procedure: 
auction vs. negotiation and therefore our study has a broader scope when it comes to available 
variables. To our knowledge we are the first group of researchers who begins to analyze the 
content of this database using explorative statistical techniques based on a broad range of 
variables.  
   
  
                                                     
1 We would like to thank the European Union for making  the TED data available, © European Union, 1998-
2012  
2. Methodology 
The data set is analyzed using log-linear models, see e.g. Andersen(1997) or Agresti (2002). Such 
models build only on categorical data where the logarithmically transformed probability of a cell is 
parameterized as 
 1 1 2 3 1 2 1.. 0log .. .. ..k j j j j j ji i i i i i i i          
where only interactions up to order three are stated. 
3. The data set 
In the present study we work with TED: The Tender Electronic Daily which is ‘an online version of 
the 'Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union', dedicated to European public 
procurement’, see http://ted.europa.eu/TED/misc/aboutTed.do. In addition to being a forum for doing 
business in the procurement field with announcements and notices and links to detailed specifications 
of the projects, the site also contains a database including all public procurement contracts in the EU 
countries back to 2003. However, it is possible only to retrieve data through the archives 5 years back 
in time. We exclusively use data from awarded contracts and do not look at tender announcements. 
The contracts are text documents and for some of our variables of interest also a data-sheet is 
available. But to sum up only limited parts of the information is made ready for use in a more 
traditional database sense. Hence in order to use these data a large amount of work has to be done. In 
our case the data collection has been made by a group of former CBS students and one of their 
friends2. Using data crawling techniques they have collected data on all contracts during the period 
2003-2008. In the present study we focus exclusively on the Danish contracts. In the awarded 
contracts we have information on the authority who is responsible for the tender, the country of the 
authority, the country and region where the project is going to take place (NUTS geographical codes), 
the identity of the winner (but not with CVR-number only name, address, telephone number and 
sometimes homepage), the estimated price (available at time of the contract notice), the final awarded 
price, award criteria (lowest price or most economic tender or not defined), type of contract (Works, 
Supply, Combined, Service), Procedure (open, restricted, negotiated without a call, negotiated with a 
call, accelerated, competitive dialogue, negotiated), type of bid (global tender, partial tender, global or 
partial tender, not defined),  number of bids, the industry by CPV-codes.  
4. The data set used for this analysis – some descriptives 
One challenge of the database is that not all of these variables are available for each contract. Most 
supply contracts do e.g. not include value/price information and in other cases like the number of bids 
the information may simply be missing3. 
                                                     
2 We would like to thank Michael Friis, Richard Bundsgaard and Thomas M. Mathiesen for extraction of the 
data. 
3The data was extracted by collecting information from the parts of TED called data and current language. We 
have later discovered that at least for Denmark this implies that in many cases the number of bids variable will 
be missing.  
Also, in our analyses all counting variables and continuous variables are grouped to just three 
categories. These categories all have the form "high", "Medium" and "Small". The definition of the 
categories is performed by cutting at the lower and upper quartile, such that "Small" refers to values 
below the lower quartile and "High" corresponds to values above the upper quartile. By this definition 
half of the observations are found in the "Medium" category, which also could be considered as 
"Usual, "Typical" etc.  
The variables are we focus on here are: Award criteria, number of bids,  value,  international (A 
dummy for whether the winner comes from another country than the procuring authority), procedure 
(the type of procedure), type of contract 
For the variable number of bids with less than four offers received are considered as "Small" while 
cases with more than 6 offers received are considered "High". By this definition the "Medium" 
category is restricted to the short interval from 4 to 6 received offers, but a large part of the cases are 
found in this category. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics on the categorical version of number of bids 
Number 
of bids Frequency Percent
Cumulative
Frequency
Cumulative
Percent
High 139 4.97 139 4.97
Medium 393 14.07 532 19.04
Missing 2012 72.01 2544 91.05
Small 250 8.95 2794 100.00
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics on the type of contract 
Type of contract Frequency Percent
Cumulative
Frequency
Cumulative 
Percent 
Works 300 10.74 300 10.74 
Supply contract 750 26.84 1050 37.58 
Service contract 1744 62.42 2794 100.00 
From this it must be concluded that too few contracts exist for categories 4, 5 and 6 of the negotiation 
procedure variable. Should they be set together with other categories or deleted? Moreover nearly 
2000 contracts give no information for this variable.  
  
Table 3: Descriptive statistics on the procedure 
 
           
 
 
 
          The values are: 0: Open, 1: Restricted, 2: negotiated without a call 
          3: negotiated with a call, 4: ccc, 5&6:  ccc. Notice that 4,5,6 are not 
        included in the analysis due to the  small number of observations. 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics on the award criterion 
 
Award 
criterion Frequency Percent
Cumulative
Frequency
Cumulative 
Percent 
1 478 17.11 478 17.11 
2 2286 81.82 2764 98.93 
8 & 9 30 1.07 2794 100.00 
  
 The values are: 1: lowest price, 2: The most economic tender, 8: not  
 defined/not applicable. The last category is excluded from the analysis 
  due to the low number of observations.  
  
The value of the contract is categorized in the following way: First, the value is the total value of the 
contract i.e. for a partial tender the value is the sum of the sub contracts. Next the value variable is 
divided into 3 categories: small, medium and high where contracts with a total value less than < 
2,400,000 DKK are considered "Small" and contracts with a total value larger than 18,500,000 DKK 
are considered "High". 
The definition of the variables number of bids and value could of course be altered as it is very 
sensitive to the limits for "Small" and "High". Especially the definition of number of bids = "Small" 
for offers received < 4 gives too many in the category while a definition of offers received < 3would 
give too many. 
  
procedure Frequency Percent
Cumulative
Frequency
Cumulative 
Percent 
0 315 38.99 315 38.99 
1 402 49.75 717 88.74 
2 57 7.05 774 95.79 
3 26 3.22 800 99.01 
4 6 0.74 806 99.75 
5 or 6 2 0.25 808 100.00 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics on the value 
value Frequency Percent
Cumulative
Frequency
Cumulative 
Percent 
High 166 5.94 166 5.94 
Medium 334 11.95 500 17.90 
Missing 2128 76.16 2628 94.06 
Small 166 5.94 2794 100.00 
 
5. Results: two cases for analyses using as many variables as possible 
Many observations unfortunately have missing values for number of bids and value. One problem is 
that contracts for 2008 are reported insufficiently in our data set as number of bids is actually in the 
TED database but they are recorded as missing.  Only 22 contracts present information of both 
variables they cannot be included in the same analysis. Similarly the variables procedure and value 
unfortunately are only both available for 21 observations. For this reason the analysis is performed for 
two cases of variables included. 
Case A 
For an analysis of the variables award criterion, number of bids, international, type of procedure, type 
of contract a total of 769 observations are available when missing values are excluded and the very 
rare categories for the procedure variables are also excluded. 
Case B 
For an analysis of the variables award criterion, value, international and a total of 659 are available 
when missing values are excluded. 
 5.1 Results for Case A 
Table 6: Results for Case A 
Maximum Likelihood Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Chi-Square p-value 
Award Criterion 1 5.20 0.0225 
procedure 3 14.18 0.0027 
Award Criterion*procedure 2* 0.94 0.6239 
Number of bids 2 9.34 0.0094 
Award Criterion*number of bids 2 4.21 0.1221 
Number of bids*procedure 5* 19.44 0.0016 
Award Criterion*number of bids*procedure 3* 12.10 0.0070 
Maximum Likelihood Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Chi-Square p-value 
international 1 15.23 <.0001 
international*procedure 3 11.96 0.0075 
Type of contract 2 2.84 0.2423 
international*type of contract 2 24.83 <.0001 
procedure*type of contract 6 9.13 0.1664 
international*procedure*type of contract 3* 13.20 0.0042 
Award Criterion*type of contract 2 1.20 0.5488 
Award Criterion *procedure*type of contract 4* 22.18 0.0002 
Likelihood Ratio 24 22.99 0.5204 
 
One of the combinations is impossible by definition: award criterion= Lowest price and procedure = 3 
negotiated with a call. Moreover procedure = 3, negotiated with a call, is never seen in combination 
with a value of "High" for the number of bids. This means that some of the cells in the contingency 
table are empty. For this reason some estimated effects are marked by a star which means that the 
degrees of freedom for these effects are reduced accordingly. 
The conclusion is that three three-factor interactions are significant, which gives a rather complicated 
dependence structure. The structure could be displayed as 
Graph 1: Relationships amongst important selected variables 
 
 
The three shadings of the triangles indicate that three factor interactions are present. These three factor 
interactions means that the dependence of two of the variables in a triangle is dependent of the value 
of the third variable. The diagram tells that award criterion, type of contract and procedure together 
form the axis of the dependencies in the table. One direct interpretation is that the two least connected 
variables are international and number of bids and they are independent conditioned upon the three 
other variables. Number of bids only dependent on procedure and on award criterion. The nationality 
of winner only depends on the type of contract and on procedure. 
The most natural way to describe the third order interactions is to start by considering the various 
categories of activity. This is obvious as these values are not subject to any stochastic variation neither 
due to the procuring authority nor to the potential bidding companies. That is to analyze the 
dependence structure for each of the outcomes of the variable type of contract separately. 
Type of contract = 1 "Works" 
We have only 84 observations for this value. 
Here number of bids and international are independent of the pair of award criterion and procedure. 
The dependence between award criterion and procedure is the obvious that award criterion = 1 ( 
Lowest price) and procedure = 0 (Open) often is combined while award criterion=2 (Most economic 
tender) is chosen for the other various forms of negotiation (procedure= 2 or 3).  
 
Table 7: Results for “Work” 
Maximum Likelihood Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Chi-Square p-value 
Award Criterion 1 1.47 0.2247 
Procedure 3 17.83 0.0005 
Award Criterion*procedure 2* 14.95 0.0006 
Number of bids 2 21.19 <.0001 
International 1 14.93 0.0001 
Likelihood Ratio 6 10.20 0.1163 
 
  
 Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Parameter  Estimate
Standard
Error
Chi-
Square p-value 
Award Criterion 1 -0.6666 0.5491 1.47 0.2247 
procedure 0 1.1037 0.6018 3.36 0.0667 
1 2.0441 0.6068 11.35 0.0008 
2 0.0406 0.4474 0.01 0.9277 
Award Criterion*procedure 1 0 1.5895 0.6308 6.35 0.0117 
1 1 0.3063 0.5676 0.29 0.5894 
1 2 . . . . 
Number of bids High -0.3396 0.2042 2.77 0.0963 
Medium 0.7423 0.1629 20.78 <.0001 
international 0 1.0202 0.2641 14.93 0.0001 
 
Type of contract = 2 "Supply contract" 
Here we have 173 observations. 
Here award criterion and number of bids are mutually independent and also independent of the pair 
international and procedure. The dependence between award criterion and procedure which was 
found for type of contract = works is not present for type of contract = supply. 
The dependence between international (the winner being from another country) and procedure shows 
that the winner clearly is local Danish (international = 0) for procedure = 0 (open) while it is often 
non-Danish (international=1) for procedure = 3 (negotiated with a call). Contracts of the latter type 
may in general be larger and of a type that makes it more natural to call for international bids. 
 
Table 8: Results for “Supply” 
Maximum Likelihood Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Chi-Square p-value
Award Criterion 1 35.70 <.0001
procedure 3 33.35 <.0001
international 1 1.67 0.1967
internationa*procedure 3 11.63 0.0088
Number of bids 2 2.37 0.3057
Likelihood Ratio 11 18.42 0.0724
  
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Parameter  Estimate
Standard
Error
Chi- 
Square p-value
Award Criterion 1 -1.3728 0.2298 35.70 <.0001
procedure 0 1.0290 0.1974 27.18 <.0001
1 0.4265 0.2101 4.12 0.0424
2 -0.2104 0.2349 0.80 0.3703
international 0 0.2215 0.1716 1.67 0.1967
international*procedure 0 0 0.5715 0.1943 8.65 0.0033
0 1 -0.0285 0.2105 0.02 0.8923
0 2 0.0252 0.2352 0.01 0.9148
Number of bids High -0.1803 0.1254 2.07 0.1506
Medium 0.1356 0.1065 1.62 0.2029
 
Type of contract= 4 "Service contract" 
We have 512 observations of this type.  
Here award criterion and international are mutually independent and moreover independent of the 
pair of number of bids and procedure. The dependence between the number of bids and procedure 
seems rather weak. However the last part of table 9 shows that the derived parameters for procedure = 
3 (negotiated with a call) indicates that the number of bids is small for this procedure as expected.  
 
Table 9: Results for “Supply” 
Maximum Likelihood Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Chi-Square p-value 
Award Criterion 1 191.19 <.0001 
procedure 3 102.59 <.0001 
Number of bids 2 6.89 0.0319 
Number of bids*procedure 5* 11.65 0.0400 
international 1 179.35 <.0001 
Likelihood Ratio 15 21.57 0.1197 
 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Parameter  Estimate
Standard
Error
Chi- 
Square p-value 
Award Criterion 1 -1.0190 0.0737 191.19 <.0001 
procedure 0 1.1746 0.2748 18.27 <.0001 
1 1.6617 0.2734 36.94 <.0001 
2 -0.7066 0.2115 11.16 0.0008 
Number of bids High -1.2582 0.5051 6.21 0.0127 
Medium 0.7215 0.2748 6.89 0.0087 
Number of bids*procedure High 0 0.8489 0.5198 2.67 0.1024 
High 1 0.6579 0.5160 1.63 0.2023 
High 2 0.3558 0.3381 1.11 0.2927 
Medium 0 -0.3969 0.2940 1.82 0.1771 
Medium 1 -0.0955 0.2864 0.11 0.7388 
Medium 2 . . . . 
international 0 1.0894 0.0813 179.35 <.0001 
 
number of offers procedure = 0 
open  
procedure = 1 
restricted 
 
procedure = 2 
negotiated without a call
procedure = 3 
negotiated with a call
High 0.8 0.7 0.4 -1.9 
Medium -0.4 -0.1 . 0.5 
Small -0.4 -0.6 -0.4 1.4 
 
5.2 Analysis of case B 
Now, the variable international is independent of all other variables.  Whether the winning firm is 
Danish or not is independent of award criteria, type of contract and value (the value of the winning 
contract). The estimated coefficient for international simply tells us that most contracts are won by 
Danish companies. 
 
  
 Table 10: Results for Case B 
Maximum Likelihood Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Chi-Square p-value 
Award Criterion 1 140.86 <.0001 
value 2 2.80 0.2463 
Award Criterion*value 2 10.75 0.0046 
Type of contract 2 68.70 <.0001 
Award Criterion*type of contract 2 19.22 <.0001 
value*type of contract 4 63.04 <.0001 
international 1 266.34 <.0001 
Likelihood Ratio 13 15.32 0.2877 
 
All two factor interactions among the variables award criterion, type of contract and value are 
significant, but the three factor interaction is insignificant. The three two factor interactions are 
described in the following three tables. 
Table 11: Award Criterion*value 
      Parameter  Estimate
Standard
Error
Chi- 
Square p-value 
Award Criterion*value 1 High -0.4100 0.1390 8.70 0.0032 
1 Medium 0.0943 0.0964 0.96 0.3279 
             
The table shows that Award Criterion = ‘Lowest price’ seldom is combined with high values of the 
(winning) bid. As the log linear parameters sum to zero in all directions it then states that high values 
are usual combined with Award Criterion =’Most economic tender’. For small values of the (winning) 
bid the award criterion is more likely to be lowest price. The meaning of this is that more concerns 
than just lowest price is present for contract of high value. 
  
Table 12  Award Criterion*type of contract 
Parameter  Estimate
Standard
Error
Chi- 
Square p-value
Award Criterion*type of contract 1 1 0.6036 0.1604 14.17 0.0002
1 2 -0.5068 0.1166 18.88 <.0001
 
As seen from this table award criterion =’Lowest price’ is often seen for contracts of "works" but not 
for supply contracts. Award criterion =’Most economic tender’ is on the other hand overrepresented 
for "works" and less often seen for "supply contracts". As the two estimated parameters for award 
criterion = ‘Lowest price’ and type of contract =’Works’ and ‘Supply’ has a sum close to zero type of 
contract = "service contracts" is independent of award criterion.  
Table 13 value*type of contract 
 
Parameter  Estimate
Standard
Error
Chi-
Square p-value 
value*type of contract High 1 1.5196 0.2038 55.61 <.0001 
High 2 -0.8859 0.1282 47.73 <.0001 
Medium 1 -0.8530 0.2639 10.45 0.0012 
Medium 2 0.5677 0.1448 15.37 <.0001 
As both of these categorical variables have three categories the parameters should be read, keeping in 
mind that the values for value = ‘Small’ or type of contract =’Service’ is derived such that all sums 
should be zero. The table should then be extended (excluding standard deviations and reducing the 
number of digits presented). 
Table 14 full table for value*type of contract 
value Type of contract= 
Works 
Type of contract= 
Supply contract 
Type of contract 
Service contract 
High 1.5 -0.9 -0.6 
Medium -0.9 0.6 0.3 
Small -0.6 0.3 0.3 
This table shows that "works" contracts more often are of high value while supply contracts are of 
small or medium value. Service contracts are more equally distributed to value, but small and medium 
value contracts are most common. 
  
6. Conclusion - future work  
In the present study we explore the content and possibilities of the TED data base. Our experience 
with TED has shown that there are major challenges when extraction the data and that this process can 
probably be refined for future studies. Still our preliminary study of categorical data demonstrates that 
there are correlations and conditional correlations present amongst the variables. We definitely believe 
that it will be worth investigating these linkages more thoroughly in the future. Both research 
questions that relates to the internationalization of public procurement in the EU and also questions 
that relate to the types of procedure that are chosen can be analyzed in more detail due to the coverage 
of this database. Also the possibility of conducting studies that narrow the scope to e.g. specific 
countries or industries will be of interest to future studies. 
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Appendix A: An example of an awarded contract showing the type of information and the way it 
is organized. (extracted from TED on 3 December 2012 in original language part). 
01/12/2012    S232    Member states - Service contract - Contract award - Negotiated procedure   
I.II.IV.V.VI. 
DK-Nakskov: programming services of application software 
2012/S 232-381733 
Contract award notice – utilities 
Directive 2004/17/EC 
 
Section I: Contracting entity 
I.1)Name, addresses and contact point(s) 
Lolland Forsyning A/S 
Stavangervej 13 
Contact point(s): Lolland Forsyning A/S 
For the attention of: Line Mackenhauer 
4900 Nakskov 
DENMARK 
Telephone: +45 41781163 
E-mail: lima@lollandforsyning.dk 
Internet address(es):  
General address of the contracting entity: http://www.lollandforsyning.dk 
I.2)Main activity 
Production, transport and distribution of gas and heat 
Electricity 
Water 
Other: Spildevand 
I.3)Contract award on behalf of other contracting entities 
The contracting entity is purchasing on behalf of other contracting entities: no 
 Section II: Object of the contract 
II.1)Description 
II.1.1)Title attributed to the contract 
Nyt fælles GIS/Anlægsregistreringssystem for forsyningsarterne spildevand, vand, fjernvarme og el. 
II.1.2)Type of contract and location of works, place of delivery or of performance 
Services 
Service category No 7: Computer and related services 
Main site or location of works, place of delivery or of performance: Nakskov. 
DANMARK. 
NUTS code DK022 
II.1.3)Information about a framework agreement or a dynamic purchasing system (DPS) 
II.1.4)Short description of the contract or purchase(s): 
Den udbudte kontrakt vedrører et fælles standardsystem til GIS/Anlægsregistrering for 
forsyningsarterne spildevand, vand, fjernvarme, el (el-distribution, gadelys og kabler). 
Forsyningsområdet dækker Lolland Kommune, som har 50 000 indbyggere og et areal på 882 
kvadratkilometer. Systemet skal omfatte værktøj til registrering og vedligeholdelse af 
anlægsdokumentation, til analyse, til at kigge på data, til brug for markpersonale samt til 
systemadministration. Der efterspørges web-klienter til analyse og datavisning samt mobile klienter til 
brug for markpersonale. Der skal være mulighed for automatisk udlevering af ledningsoplysninger i 
forbindelse med integration til Ledningsejerregisteret. 
Der efterspørges et system, der implementerer Danva's danske standarder for datamodeller, 
DanDAS og DanVAND, eller tilsvarende. For forsyningsarterne vand og spildevand skal 
data, herunder TV-inspektioner og brøndrapporter, kunne ind- og udlæses via formaterne 
DanVand-XML og DanDAS-xml. Oplysninger om køb og implementering af DanDAS- og 
DanVand-datamodellerne kan findes på www.danva.dk. 
Leverancen omfatter følgende: konfigurering af systemet i henhold til Lolland Forsynings krav, 
konvertering af data fra de nuværende ledningsregistreringssystemer, afvikling på hosted hardware hos 
en driftsleverandør valgt af Lolland Forsyning, uddannelse af brugere samt vedligeholdelse og support 
i en 4-årig periode fra overtagelsesdagen. 
Lolland Forsyning stiller en driftsplatform, herunder hardware, databasesoftware, 
datalagringskapacitet, sikkerhed m.v. til rådighed. 
II.1.5)Common procurement vocabulary (CPV) 
72212000, 72212222, 72212517, 72260000 
II.1.6)Information about Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) 
The contract is covered by the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA): yes 
II.2)Total final value of contract(s) 
II.2.1)Total final value of contract(s) 
Value: 3 721 740,00 DKK 
Excluding VAT 
 
Section IV: Procedure 
IV.1)Type of procedure 
IV.1.1)Type of procedure 
Negotiated with a call for competition 
IV.2)Award criteria 
IV.2.1)Award criteria 
The most economically advantageous tender 
IV.2.2)Information about electronic auction 
An electronic auction will be used: no 
IV.3)Administrative information 
IV.3.1)File reference number attributed by the contracting entity: 
IV.3.2)Previous publication(s) concerning the same contract 
  
Contract notice 
Notice number in the OJEU: 2012/S 108-180028 of 8.6.2012 
 
Section V: Award of contract 
V.1)Award and contract value 
V.1.1)Date of contract award decision: 
12.10.2012 
V.1.2)Information about offers 
Number of offers received: 3 
V.1.3)Name and address of economic operator in favour of whom the contract award decision 
has been taken 
Intergraph Danmark A/S 
Hørkær 12 A 
2730 Herlev 
DENMARK 
Telephone: +45 19362000 
E-mail: jackie.sandgaard@intergraph.com 
Internet address: www.intergraph.com 
V.1.4)Information on value of contract 
Total final value of the contract 
Value: 3 721 740,00 DKK 
Excluding VAT 
V.1.5)Information about subcontracting 
The contract is likely to be sub-contracted: no 
V.1.6)Price paid for bargain purchases 
Section VI: Complementary information 
VI.1)Information about European Union funds 
The contract is related to a project and/or programme financed by European Union funds: no 
VI.2)Additional information: 
Den oplyste pris er incl. 4 års vedligeholdelse excl. optioner. 
VI.3)Procedures for appeal 
VI.3.1)Body responsible for appeal procedures 
Klagenævnet for Udbud, Erhvervsstyrelsen 
Kampmannsgade 1 
1789 København V 
DENMARK 
E-mail: klfu@erst.dk 
Telephone: +45 35291000 
Internet address: www.klfu.dk 
Body responsible for mediation procedures  
Klagenævnet for Udbud, Erhvervsstyrelsen 
Kampmannsgade 1 
1789 København V 
DENMARK 
E-mail: klfu@erst.dk 
Telephone: +45 35291000 
Internet address: www.klfu.dk 
VI.3.2)Lodging of appeals 
VI.3.3)Service from which information about the lodging of appeals may be obtained 
Klagenævnet for Udbud, Erhvervsstyrelsen 
Kampmannsgade 1 
1789 København V 
DENMARK 
E-mail: klfu@erst.dk 
Telephone: +45 35291000 
Internet address: www.klfu.dk 
VI.4)Date of dispatch of this notice: 
28.11.2012 
